



Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000500040051-5

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

TCS-4166-58 /1
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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, Ad Hoc Requirements Committee

SUBJECT: National Priority Objectives vis-a-vis CHALICE

collection of Talent materials
1. A critical examination of the highest priority objectives for the ~~U-2 reconnaissance program~~ as reflected in the statement of requirements dated 2 June 1958 has been completed, ~~The review has taken~~ into consideration the following factors:

- a. The time-factor urgency of the information.
 - b. The direct relationship of each highest priority objective category to the degree of threat it imposes against the United States, using criteria established for the determination of Highest Priority National Intelligence Objectives.
 - c. The availability of information from other sources.
2. ~~As set forth in TABS "A", "B" and "C",~~ It is clearly evident that ICBM requirements belong at the apex of the highest priority structure over other missile weapon systems, nuclear weapons, and long range bomber aircraft.
3. To enable the United States Intelligence Community to assess the overall threat inherent in the Soviet ICBM program, consideration must be given to information concerning (a) deployment of operational missiles; (b) research, development and testing underway; and (c) relationship of ICBM research and development to future space weapon systems.
4. The threat to the U. S. implicit in the Soviet operational inter-continental ballistic missile is of an entirely new order of magnitude. The gravity of this threat reaches to maximum proportions as the Soviets develop an operational capability in their ICBM program. Continuing accurate knowledge of the progress of deployment of Soviet ICBM's is requisite to determining the nature and magnitude of the Soviet ICBM threat. The industrial and technical capability already exists for the output of products involved in the ICBM weapon system;

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Memo for Chairman, Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (cont'd)

the USSR should now be involved in the problem of determining precise location and initiating construction of ICBM launch sites. Search photography of the most likely operational deployment areas offers the potential of obtaining locations and types of sites. It is possible that Soviet philosophy on operational deployment may not be apparent until the first ICBM launching site has been discovered.

5. Information on the Soviet guided missile research and development complex is considered critical. Technological changes are becoming so rapid, so penetrating and in many instances, so contradictory, that the direct and indirect results of the technological revolution tend to control the nature and application of tomorrow's air strategy. Rapid obsolescence of weapon systems increases the risk involved in committing large quantities of resources to weapon systems which could be obsolete before ever being effective. Reconnaissance may reveal further information on range heads down range instrumentation and other facts concerning missile capabilities.

6. The Soviet program to develop astronautic vehicles and space weapon systems is progressing at an alarming rate. Developments toward mastery of space will be the focal point of international interest and technological competition during the next decade. The SPUTNIKS were the initial step into space and further strides can be expected in this era of rapid scientific and technological advances. Progressive developments leading to true space travel will result in vehicles having a potential for military application as reconnaissance vehicles (manned or unmanned), orbital bombers, and other space weapon systems. Reconnaissance will establish a specific military application intended by the Soviets and possibly the detection of developments which could give the USSR a technological advantage in control and utilization of space.

7. Based on studies that have been conducted for the Intelligence Community by certain advisory groups over the past two years, it is evident that the U-2 offers the only means as reasonable assurance of obtaining information on the Soviet ICBM program. In the Strong Committee report dated 13 December 1957, it was concluded that chances varied from 5 to 10% for locating Soviet ICBM launch sites when conventional collection methods were used without the benefit of aerial reconnaissance. In the Highland Report dated 14 November 1958, it was concluded that the risks in utilization of the U-2 appears to be smaller than the risks to the security of the United States in not acquiring the needed data on Soviet ICBM sites. A study being undertaken by the Critical Collections

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Memo for Chairman, Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (cont'd)

Priority Committee at the present time, and scheduled for consideration on 21 December, concludes that the greatest opportunities for acquiring information on ICBM deployment will be present while sites under construction and intensification and expansion of an overflight program is a means of collection.

3 Incls
TABS "A", "B",
and "C"
(not complete)

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